Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 45
Number 45 Fall 2001

Article 9

10-1-2001

Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution
Laina Farhat

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr
Recommended Citation
Farhat, Laina (2001) "Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 45 : No. 45 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol45/iss45/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Comparative
Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu,
ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Farhat: Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution
106

JANUS BLINDSIDED: THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION
LAINA FARHAT
I.

Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of Iran has had spillover effect throughout
the Middle East and the world. In the intervening two decades since that
cataclysm, many scholars have attempted to analyze the causes and to
speculate why a modernizing revolution turned into a backward march.
Although scholars generally agree on the basic events of the monarchy's
collapse, there is no agreement on the causes and the reasons for such
draconian consequences. It is not at all clear, despite the conventional
wisdom, that this revolution was the inevitable consequence of a modernizing and dictatorial leader in confrontation with a dearly beloved
religion.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was second in a dynasty dedicated
to the modernization of a once distinguished, but by 1920, underdeveloped pivotal state. The Shah's long reign (1941-1979) was brought to an
end in 1979 and his government was replaced by an "Islamic republic."
We now know that all of the players and observers were astonished by
this collapse and unprepared for the theocracy that triumphed. It had not
looked at all inevitable.
Elsewhere in the world, two centuries of revolutions have replaced
monarchies with at least ostensibly representative governments. The
creation of the United States was the first, followed by France, Russia,
and China. Other states lost their monarchies after World War I
(Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Germany) and others revolted
against colonial masters to obtain their independence.
In all of these cases, the revolutions were conceived as modernizing movements: that is, movements that extended the franchise to people who traditionally had been subject to authoritarian government. In
the case of the United States, the franchise has continued to expand
from its initial group of land owning white male peers to all males, and
finally to females.
France, whose revolution was far more violent than America's, suffered a number of pendulum swings from monarchy to anarchy and then
to. empire and then to republic, with the franchise permitting women to
participate as late as the mid-20th century.
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Russia and China went from absolute monarchies to absolute dictatorships, ostensibly of the proletariat, but in actuality party-military
dictatorships.
In all of these cases, however, the revolutions professed that their
people were capable of participation in their own governance, and universal public education was established to make it so.
What happened in Iran in 1979 cannot rightly be called a revolution. It was a counter-revolution — that is, a revolt against most of the
elements of 20th century modernization that had been undertaken by the
Pahlavis.(l) People voted, but only for candidates that met the approval
of the clerics.The actual rule was in the hands of an 80-year-old charismatic cleric and a council of like-minded clerics who "knew best" for
everyone. After an orgy of executions (2) and assassinations, the clerics
maintained their total power through the use of religious storm troopers,
who invaded (and still invade) households and apprehend women in the
street to check for makeup, perfume, and insufficient coverage. They
also created a parallel military arm to keep a close eye on the regular
army, even in the battlefields of the Iran/Iraq war.(3) In addition, they
have censorship power over communications and even after 20 years,
veto power over political candidates for office.
Elections continued to be held, but the first secular elected president did not have a chance to carry out his programs in the face of clerical objections and the second was assassinated by dissidents. The first
president, Bani-Sadr, barely escaped with his life to France(4) and then
Foreign Minister, Qobtzadeh, was executed. Thereafter, there were no
more secular presidents. Every official since then has been a member of
the clergy, including today's favorite of the liberals, Mr. Khatami.(5)
Iran is now in a revolutionary mode again—this time, perhaps, to
take back what the people thought they were getting twenty years ago—
a secular and modern state without an all-knowing father to tell them
how to live.
How did such an event as strange as the Islamic Revolution occur?
What have the experts said about it over the years? How can one know
what actually happened and how can one account for the astonishing
lack of critical thinking that set it off?
II.

Theories

In the existing literature, the theories for why this strange counterrevolution occurred can be summed up as follows: 1) the Shah modern-
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ized too fast and alienated masses of people; 2) the growing middle
class wanted to have some say in their governance but the autocratic
Shah prevented it; 3) the public resented the Americanization of the culture and wanted to reassert Persian traditional values; 4) the oil boom
spurred a revolution of rising expectations, and when the boom collapsed, resentment exploded; 5) population explosion sent rural populations into cities, which could not rapidly accommodate them or deal
with their culture shock; 6) intellectuals, infiltrated by Marxist plants,
took national discontent international; 7) the best traditionally-organized sector, the Shiite clergy, were joined by Marxist-trained plants, to
unseat what seemed to be an invulnerable monarchy; 8) the Shah was
fighting a secret battle with cancer which left him vulnerable at the
exact same time that the US, under Jimmy Carter, was clueless and
divided in its policy toward Iran; and of course 9) the favorite Iranian
conspiracy theory that the British did it with American help.
All of these theories, with the exception of Nos. 3 and 9, have an
element of truth. Only the clergy resented America culture, not the public. The youthful participation in the 1978 revolution was done in the
style of the US anti-war movement and the French student revolts of the
1960s. It is obvious from today's simmering revolution that the youth,
people under 30, who make up 70 percent of the country, have no grievance whatsoever against American culture and risk punishment in
flaunting it.(6)
As for the conspiracy theory that the British wanted to get rid of the
Shah and replace him with the Ayatollah, this is the usual Iranian
predilection for blaming outside forces for their own bad choices.(7)
Even the late Shah could not conceive that what the BBC did and what
the British government did were not one and the same. He never did
understand press freedom.(8)
III. Why Did it Happen?
Iran's painful process of modernization resembles those of Turkey,
Russia, China, India, and many others. Most backward countries are
backward because the groups that hold the power want it that way. Old
feudal aristocracies, including tribal ones, do not want to see power in
the hands of their peasants or herdsmen and certainly not in their merchants. For these conservative elites, public literacy, noisy intellectuals,
and participatory government are anathema.
In all such countries, however, a new class was emerging,the intel-
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ligentsia, comprised of disenchanted elites and merchants, enlightened
by travel and education. This group is very small in a backward country, and they have never succeeded in transforming their countries into
modernizing states without the intervention of an authoritarian leader
backed by military might.
Established conservative religious leadership is often one and the
same with feudal landowners. Consider how much land the Catholic
Church owned throughout Europe before the Reformation, and how
much the Russian Orthodox establishment controlled before the
Russian Revolution. In Iran, the Shiite establishment owned 50 percent
of the land before the Shah's land reform took effect and the clergy
treated their peasants no better than did aristocratic land owners.
For Iran, as well as for the modernizing countries mentioned above,
feudalism can only be challenged by an emergency that threatens the
country's very existence. An autocrat backed by arms must seize power,
and unless he can coopt the intelligentsia, they are the first to be exterminated.
The emergency for Peter the Great was Sweden, which nearly
rolled over feudal Russia. For China it was encroaching Western colonization. For Japan, it was the arrival of the American fleet. For Russia
and Turkey, it was their disastrous performances in World War I, and for
Iran, it was a close call with dismemberment during World War I and its
aftermath. None of these countries had the leisure for sentiment over
their traditional establishments or to wait for well-meaning, but ineffectual intellectuals to do it.
From 1922 until 1978, Iran was successfully transformed from a
feudal country with a declining population of 10 to 12 million into a
country of 35 million with a growing middle class; secular schools,
legal system, and bureaucracy; political and social equality for men and
women (on the books, at least); a modern non-political military; a growing network of banks, universities, and industrialization; and genuine
achievements in public health.(9) By 1975, it was difficult to find a pair
of bowed legs on a child (no more rickets), a condition that was prevalent in the 1920s and certainly still visible in the late 1950s. Something
was working right.
However, one of the negative fruits of modernization and improved
public health is population explosion and the flight of people from rural
to urban areas, which is initially very destabilizing. Population explosion is endangering the modernizing achievements of all of the above
states.
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IV. The 1970s
Iran's modernization started with Reza Shah Pahlavi's ascension to
power in the mid-1920s, at which time it was literally like starting from
scratch. Iran did not even have a railroad, nor anything like a national
army to permit safe travel on the country's dirt roads, nor public
schools, secular law courts, secular bureaucracy, safe drinking water,
reliable food supply, nor basic medical care. It did, however, have a
strategic location which made it vulnerable to the machinations of the
British, who were concerned with oil and the route to India, and the
Russians, who had already devoured half of Iran in the 19th century.
Reza Shah Pahlavi was the right autocrat at that moment in history. It might have been better had he been as sophisticated and modern
as Ataturk in Turkey, but then again, he matched the country he led.
There was not much that was sophisticated in Iran. He did what he
could, tirelessly, with astonishing success, until he was unseated in
1941 upon the onset of World War II.
His son, only 21 at the time of his ascension to the throne, had to
survive the machinations of the superpowers during their occupation of
Iran during World War II, and then over the next few years, he had to
learn how to become Shah. This was not easy for him. His father had
been a tough autocrat who knew his own mind, whereas his son was of
a much more tentative nature, tempered by a Swiss education, and by
the awareness that the Iran he inherited was part of the global picture.
Foreign policy was going to be much more important during his time
than in his father's time.(10)
The close call with a Soviet-attempted dismemberment of Iran's northwest province, Azerbaijani 11) and a chaotic oil nationalization campaign
conducted by a very authoritarian demagogue, Mohammad Mossadeq,
who has rather incredibly attained mythical status among Iranian Liberals
as a democrat, provided the Shah with a baptism by fire.(12)
By 1960, the Shah was ready to take up where his father left off.
He initiated land reform and enfranchisement of women, both of which
issues inflamed the clergy, and in 1963 he put down a Shiite revolt led
by a cleric named Khomeini. Firmness paid off, and the country was
quiet and progressed rapidly for the next 15 years.
Like his father, he had become a hands-on autocrat. Also, like all
autocrats, he never knew whom he could trust. His cabinets were
remarkably good; he was fortunate in the quality of the talented, patriotic and well educated men he attracted, but he could never discount
self-interest in their advice.
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What succeeded over the period of 15 years, fueled by an enormous boom in oil prices, gave the Shah an overconfidence that began to
work against him. By 1975, the rising middle class was ready to take on
more governance. The proliferation of western-style universities were
churning out intellectuals with western standards and a taste for
American-style protest. The public was frustrated when promised the
moon—only to have these ambitious programs be cut back when the oil
boom crashed, which it did in 1975.(13)
Finally, instability was increasing as hoards of peasants flocked
into the cities where good jobs, but no housing, awaited them. These
people became a displaced element that was neither traditional nor
modern. The clergy had more success than the Marxists in recruiting
them. Here was a ready supply of "rent-a mobs," which played (and still
play) a role in the counter-revolution.
V.

International Elements

The internal stresses were not the Shah's only problems. The late
1970s saw also what we now know know as the last hurrah of the
Soviet Union. The Marxists had a considerable establishment of moles
and agents in Iran, and the mid-70s instability offered a tempting target. Marxists infiltrated the intellectuals and lower level clergy, as
well as effectively planting stories and manipulating the international
press. This is a whole new area for scholars to explore.
The United States, under Jimmy Carter's presidency, was launching a policy of concern for human rights, which had not been a major
consideration during the Cold War. However, Carter's National Security
Advisor Zbrigniew Brzezinski was not in line with this policy; the Cold
War was still his most important concern. The State Department, under
Cyrus Vance, was pushing human rights issues. Carter was in the middle, and never did make up his mind which way to go.(14)
The Shah responded to the growing internal stresses in his own
country by jumping from one policy to another, in an attempt to find the
right formula. He loosened up on repression in an effort to pacify internal criticism and to secure the friendship of Jimmy Carter. This was
done unwisely at the time of economic crash, and served only to
embolden demonstrators, who no longer feared him.(15)
The thousands of students whom he enabled to study abroad were
influenced by the Vietnam War demonstrations in the US and the
French student revolt in Paris. Students follow the leader. It became the
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fashion to attack the Shah as the be-all and end-all of Iran's problems.
Students—and there were many of them who felt loyalty to the Shah—
were intimidated into silence.
Propaganda wars raged in Iran: ineptly by the Shah and the state
organs of dissemination (the Iranian press and television) and very
effectively by the BBC programs beamed into Iran and by the Marxists
and intellectuals who set up underground presses.(16) A handful of
French-trained Iranian leftists allied themselves to the one charismatic
figure who could oppose the Shah, the Ayatollah Khomeini, at that time
in exile in Paris. This group carefully stage-managed the Ayatollah's
meetings with the press (they carefully scripted his answers to written
questions from the press) and they disseminated the preposterous notion
that he was a gentle saint and Gandhi-like pacifist who would just be a
figurehead after they got rid of the Shah.( 17)
Once the skills of the leftist were combined with the clout of the
clerics, the revolutionary machine was almost unstoppable. SAVAK,
which had such a reputation for ruthless efficiency, showed how hollow
it really was. It had focused too long on harassing the intelligentsia and
was unaware of the danger from the clerics until it was too late. The
Shah saw the danger too late — and called it the alliance of black reaction and red revolution — but nobody listened.
When the military tried to convince the Shah to crack down before
the demonstrations got worse, he protested that he would not shed the
blood of his own people. It can be said that had he acted in 1977 as he
had in 1963, a firm police response would have aborted the demonstrations, giving him time to carry out the needed democratic reforms in an
orderly fashion, backed by a recovering economy.(18)
He did not do what was needed for several reasons: he did not have
the stomach for this struggle any more, he was very uncertain about
how the US would react to a show of force because he was getting conflicting messages from Washington and from the US Ambassador daily,
and finally, he was waging a secret battle with cancer, neglecting his
health so that nobody would know the lion was wounded.
Had he acted, and had he succeeded in restoring order to the country, it is conceivable that Iran could have continued to modernize. Under
his son, Iran could have been ready for increasing parliamentary power
and continuing to educate an electorate to handle this responsibility.
There is a difference between an autocratic monarch and a totalitarian dictator, as Jean Kirkpatrick once noted. The autocrat wants
external obedience; the totalitarian wants mind control. This was the
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difference between the two "big daddies" who controlled Iran. The
Shah thought he was the only person who could make things happen
that were for the good of his people, and the Ayatollah knew that God
talked to him, and that he knew what was best for them.(19)
The Shah wanted a country that could be like Switzerland — orderly, prosperous, a player in the global society. The Ayatollah wanted a
people who would sit at home on the floor, as he did, praying five times
a day, eating bread, cheese, and onions, and reading the Koran. In his
more grandiose moods, however, the Ayatollah wanted Iran to be an
international player too, fomenting Shiite revolts against the leadership
of all the other Muslim countries.(20)
VII. Sources for Critical Thinkers Today
In undertaking the task of revisiting the Iranian Revolution after 20
years, I was confronted with the conventional view that the Shah was
his own worst enemy and that he deserved unseating, and that nobody
could possible have known how terrible the Ayatollah Khomeini would
be. My research, gathered from the printed literature during the revolution and afterwards, put out both by major players—including the Shah
himself—and all sorts of minor players, including young intellectuals
and some famous Iran scholars, forced me to dismiss both of the above
conventional views. In addition, I was in Iran as the revolution gathered
steam, and I had my own journals to consult. The following is a sampling of the literature that seemed essential to this study.
The Shah. Three books were written by the late Shah: Mission for
My Country (1960), The White Revolution (1970 ), and his last sad work
written in exile just before his death from cancer, Answer to History
(1980). Of course autobiographies put the best possible face on the
writer, yet the Shah's passionate concern for the development of his
country comes through with sincerity. He certainly cared, and at the end
of his life, he was aware of many of the mistakes he made. He considered them more mistakes of omission than commission, which is not
necessarily so.
A fascinating study of the Shah and his work was E. A. Bayne's
Persian Kingship in Transition, the fruit of ten years of interviews and
long discussions between the author and the Shah. Bayne had no particular bias, being a foreign scholar and official of the World Bank, and
while his book does not flatter the Shah, it does validate the Shah's passion for his work.
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A book that was extremely valuable in assessing the Shah's daily
life, successes, and foibles, was written by Asodollah Alam: The Shah
and I: the Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977. Alam
was Prime Minister during the volatile early 1960s and then Court
Minister until his death of cancer, one year before the revolution. He
had known the Shah since they were both 20, and in his diaries, which
were not published until after his death, he was uncommonly frank for
a person from a culture that does not reward bluntness. In this book, one
could see the enormous passion for the country's development that the
Shah and Alam shared, and their faults were the faults of their country
and class: unquestioning chauvinism, touchiness in how the world
regarded Iran, compulsive womanizing, and personal vanity.
The brother of the last of the Shah's Prime Ministers, Fereydun
Hoveyda, who served for many years in the foreign ministry, wrote a
passionate memoir of his time working for the Shah. Hoveyda was an
avowed leftist, and was surprised when the Shah invited him into government service. He compared the hopeful early years with the increasing isolation of the Shah during his last five years, and blames the Shah
for not rescuing Prime Minister Hoveyda from prison where he was
unceremoniously murdered.
Marvin Zonis's work, The Iranian Elite, has always been among
the best source books on Iran. Then Zonis wrote Majestic Failure: The
Fall of the Shah, which was an attempt at psycho-history, psychoanalysis of the subject without benefit of personal acquaintance. All of the
troubling characteristics he attributes to the Shah's childhood and relationship with his father are characteristics almost universal in Iran. John
Stempel (Inside the Iranian Revolution) does a far better job of showing
the ancient history of father-son love-hate relationships in Iran and how
often they are transferred to the Shah and his subjects.
William Shawcross' The Shah's Last Ride is a sad account of the
Shah in exile, being shunted from place to place by politicians, being
medically abused during his last bouts of cancer, and rethinking his life
and its dreadfully approaching end. He met his fate with dignity and
learned at the end who his real friends were. The people who cared
about him at the end were the first true friends he had ever had —
among them his wife Farah, Egypt's Anwar Sadaat, Nelson Rockefeller,
and surprisingly, Richard Nixon.
This Shah was very Iranian indeed, and not just the product of some
peculiar childhood environment. He was not out of touch with all
Iranians, but he certainly did not have the common touch. He did not
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know the religious class and peasants, nor did most westernized
Iranians. Court culture and his own personal shyness got in the way of
his knowing these sectors of the society, as did his stifling of the press
and his scorn for "wooly-headed intellectuals."
Other ways of assessing the Shah came through reading the works
of people who had considerable contact with him: the last American
Ambassador, William Sullivan (Mission to Iran), the last British
Ambassador, Anthony Parsons (The Pride and the Fall: Iran 19741979) and American General Robert E. Huyser (Mission to Tehran).
One needed to be alert that each of these three were writing selfjustifying books, and it appears that Sullivan needed the most justifying. His account and Huyser's account differ, and the evidence that
Sullivan was secretly undercutting Huyser's mission renders Sullivan
the less trustworthy. I interviewed Huyser and found him to be convincing. Sullivan actually professed that the Ayatollah was a benign
force, and one better to support than the Shah. This was a questionable
judgment indeed.
Anatomy of the Revolution. There are many viewers in hindsight
who have attempted over these 20 years to assess why and how this revolution happened. The writers mentioned above did their assessments of
these events too, and among them, Ambassador Parsons comes the closest to the mark. He used his knowledge of Iranian 20th century history
(in which the British played a major role) to put the revolution in perspective. He quite rightly called it a counter-revolution, which is a very
important insight.
Fereydun Hoveyda, mentioned above, also tracks the personality
change of the Shah which may have played a major role in the disaster,
which is corroborated by Asodollah Alam.
One particularly interesting analysis comes from a married couple,
a British woman and her Iranian husband, both journalism professors in
Tehran. Annabelle and Ali Mohammadi's Small Media, Big Revolution:
Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution, expose how
underground communications by means as simple as duplicating
machines undid the state propaganda disseminated by the government.
The BBC played a major role here too, which one can criticize as being
one-sided and sensational.
An important book was written by Robert Graham, and economist
and the London Times bureau chief in Tehran during the revolution:
Iran: The Illusion of Power. More than any other observer, he discussed
the disastrous impact of economics on spurring this revolution. The
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euphoria when the price of oil shot up resulted in an unrealistic budget
— and then when the prices collapsed, unmet expectations made people stew.
One of the more interesting books was written by the first elected
president of Khomeini's Iran, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, a French-educated intellectual, who played a major role as a handler of the Ayatollah in
Paris. He and his group made certain that the Ayatollah's real intentions
were not made public. They massaged his words through careful translations, sent cassettes of his sermons to Iran for dissemination, and then
were astonished when the Ayatollah eliminated them soon after his
ascent to power. Bani-Sadr escaped from Iran in a woman's wig and
chaddor, unlike his colleague Foreign Minister Qobtzadeh, who was
executed. After the death of the Ayatollah, Bani-Sadr wrote a scathing
account of life with the Ayatollah: My Turn to Speak: Iran, the
Revolution and Secret Deals with the U.S. Of course the book is selfserving, but Bani-Sadr's ultimate hatred of the Ayatollah Khomeini
stemmed from his intimate experience with the old man's betrayals and
hypocrisy. It is difficult to imagine that this came as a surprise to him.
The Role of Shi'a. This revolution cannot be understood without
having some knowledge of how religion has functioned historically in
Iran. There are numerous books written by the disillusioned after
Khomeini took power: Suroosh Irfani's Iran's Islamic Revolution:
Popular Liberation of Religious Dictatorship? and Michael M. J.
Fischer's Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, are two works
that contrast Iranian and American perspectives on Shi'a. Mohammad
Mohaddessin's Islamic Fundamentalism: the New Global Threat and
Edgar O'Ballance's unduly sensational and inconsistent book, Islamic
Fundamentalist Terrorism, paint dire pictures of Shi'a as religious fascism and global menace.
Many of the above authors expressed shock and disappointment at
the behavior of the clerical establishment after the revolution. This is
surprising in the face of the historic role of Shi'a from its beginnings as
a cult of resentment and through such movements as the Assassin Cult
in the 11th century and the dreadful and repressive role of Shi'a in Iran
since it became the state religion in the 16th century. If anyone had
whispered some of these facts of life in the ear of former UN
Ambassador Andrew Young, he never would have described the
Ayatollah Khomeini as a "Gandhi-like" figure, a notion embraced by
the US State Department and Ambassador Sullivan in Iran. This terrible
error blighted US policy and left the Shah without a rudder.
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Current Views. Iran is going through a slow-motion revolution as
we write. On one side are the 70 percent of the country under the age of
30, and on the other are the religious hard-liners who control the police,
the religious thugs, and the army, and have veto power over candidates
for office and veto over parliamentary laws. Visitors from the west are
welcomed (except when thugs bomb their tour busses) and books and
long articles are pouring out. Most interesting is Sandra Mackey's The
Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. Mackey is a journalist
who wrote a fascinating and damning book about Saudi Arabia some
years ago (Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom, Signet, 1990).
Her current book is worth reading too, except for her conclusion:
that Iran's soul lies in the equal attention to Shi'a Islam and its older
Persian identity. There are things that people say privately that they
would not say to a journalist. The love affair of the left with Shi'a was
aborted when the first of many executions took place. Furthermore,
there is a long history of Iranian hostility to the clergy and, indeed,
toward Islam itself.
It was not beloved among the young intellectuals who surrounded
the Reza Shah Pahlavi, a man who realized that until he could pry Shiite
fingers off of Iran's windpipe, the country would fail to thrive. The
Pahlavis, both father and son, enjoyed more popular support than it is
popular to admit, and in retrospect and in private, they are missed.
The other significant recent work on Iran's slow motion revolution
is Robin Wright's The Last Great Revolution:
Turmoil and
Transformation in Iran, Alfred A. Knopf, NY, 2000. Wright refers to
Crane Brinton's Anatomy of a Revolution as a blueprint that works in
analyzing the Iranian Revolution as well. She notes that Iran's use of
religion in a revolution was not original. It was also part of the political
uprisings in Western societies (Protestantism, for example). After the
anciens regimes were ousted, earlier revolutions also invoked religious
values or ideals to define goals and justify revolutionary behavior, especially during the angry early years. There was an almost religious fervor "to make a better, more just world" in even atheist revolutions.
It is clear that the Revolution has not made a better world for
Iranians. She notes: "Iran in mid-1997 was a country rife with corruption more extensive than during the Pahlavi Dynasty, paralyzed politically by irreconcilable factional disputes and sinking fast economically."^)
The recent election of a fairly moderate president, Khatami, supported by 70 percent of the population that wants change and something

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol45/iss45/9

12

Farhat: Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution
118

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS

REVIEW

approaching international normality is being thwarted by the old guard
that is not about to give up their theocracy easily.
A personality who comes up repeatedly in reports on contemporary
Iran is philosophy professor Abdul Karim Soroush, who is advocating
the separation of church and state. Compulsion does not make real
piety, he says. "Tolerate the thorn [in freedom] for the sake of the
flower." (22)
He is enormously popular among the young throughout the Muslim
world, and is thoroughly disliked by the Islamists in power. If people
are given a choice, they might not choose religion at all. Organized
Islam has never taken a chance on this. Women are not permitted choice
at all, and are subject to execution if they marry a non-Muslim or if they
convert to another religion. Male converts to Islam may not change their
minds later, and those born into Islam, of course, have no choice.
The response to Soroush's plea for dialogue and religious freedom
was answered by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei: "Interpreting
religion isn't something that can be carried out by just anyone.
Jurisprudence is the main science of the clergy...If someone confronts
the clergy, he gladdens the Zionists and the Americans more than anything else...because they've set their heart on the destruction of the clergy. Well, the Islamic system will slap these people hard in the
face!"(23)
Here is the impasse. Until religion and governance are separated,
Iran will not have genuine democracy. This issue will have to be confronted down the road, and it will be painful and probably bloody.
The most perceptive book of all, which I have saved for last, is one
that appears in most of the scholars' bibliographies, but is not
addressed: Gholam R. Afkhami's The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos on
a National Scale. Afkhami served in the Shah's government and
watched with horror as the entire modern infrastructure was dismantled.
He was frustrated to see colleagues running with the revolutionary pack
with no thought of what would follow, a trajectory that should be no
surprise to intellectuals who knew the history of revolutions and the history of Shi'a Islam. Thanatos on a National Scale, or put another way,
the march of the lemmings over a cliff, is exactly what happened. A revolution thus was transformed from a forward-looking event to a
counter-revolution in which for 20 years all dissident voices were
silenced.
Where might Iran be today had been no counter-revolution?
Afkhami speculates that the Shah would be dead, and his democratic
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son would probably have been a Shah much in the style of Spain's Juan
Carlos. Popular participation in governance would have transformed the
parliament into the body it should be: a responsible and middle-class
legislature.
VIII. Conclusion
If we are to understand anything about the process of rapid modernization and its enormous dangers, we must look to past events before
helping to guide present and future players. There are many countries
in the world today with one foot in the present (or future) and one in the
past, as one can see in traveling throughout the developing or lesser
developed world. In most of these countries, there is great unrest and
the modernizing process will evoke military coupes, revolts, and sometimes civil war. Few will have a genuine revolution as in Iran, a process
that is continuing as we write, because real revolutions are rare. They
are, however, part of the same modernizing process that is resulting in
Third World unrest.
It is essential that we understand why the revolution in Iran
occurred if we are to have any predictive ability in future like cases. It
does not seem that the Pahlavi attacks on Islam were the main issue.
Rather, it was the confluence of a volatile economy, a population explosion, a flight of peasants into cities unprepared for them, the misfortune
of an autocratic king who was secretly dying, and an incompetent president in the US who was caught between conflicting agendas.
Autocracy appears to be necessary in the modernizing process of a
very feudal culture. It takes force to centralize power and execute
changes that would otherwise not happen. However, at some point, the
autocrat must know when to let the power flow to an elected parliament,
and this transfer should be done at a time of strength, not of weakness.
Most diligent autocrats know this, (both Pahlavis spoke about this), but
they do not recognize the right time to implement such a transfer. The
only autocrat in recent time who has done so was the military dictator
of Taiwan, who voluntarily transformed the country into a working
democracy, and their democracy is healthy and vibrant. He did this
when the economy and literacy rate were adequate to the task.
Finally, there is a serious cautionary element in this exploration of
the Iranian Revolution and the dangers of the modernization process.
Well-meaning intellectuals who plunge right into unstable modernizing
states help create a monster that will eat them first. It happened in every
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major revolution in the 20th century (Mexican, Russian, Chinese, and
Iranian) as well as in the French Revolution, the model for them all.
There is truth in the saying that revolutions eat their young.
Modernizing states are complex, and it is too easy to turn on the
very autocrat who brought the society to the point of viability. In the
Iranian revolution, intellectuals allowed themselves to be deceived by
Marxist opportunists, who themselves were deceived by a religious fascist, who would use them both and then exterminate them. Good intentions without solid historical knowledge can have unforeseen consequences that benefit only the next autocrat, and that autocrat may
indeed be worse than the autocrat one replaced.
Atherton, California
NOTES
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

Abrahamian, 426-7 and Afkhami, 2-4. Both noted that the socioeconomic development under the Pahlavis was not matched by
equal political development, thereby leaving the socio-economic
advances vulnerable to the Ayatollah's political monopoly.
O'Ballance, 34-35 and Irfani, an Islamic idealist who was shocked
by the executions ordered by Khomeini. See pp 211-14 for a chapter on what Khomeini said for the record and what was done in
actuality. See also Fischer, 219, who notes that by March 14, 1979,
68 people had already been executed and the Ayatollah responded
to his critics that "criminals have no right to lawyers." See also
Naraghi for an account of Islamic Justice during his three years of
imprisonment and near-execution.
Zabih, The Iranian Military, 14-18 and Bani-Sadr, Chapter 6.
Zabih provides the structure of the Iranian military before and after
the revolution, and Bani-Sadr provides a warfront picture of the
Iranian army's surprising performance in the Iran/Iraq war, despite
the Ayatololah's hostility to the military.
Wright, 16.
Taheri, 296. Former editor-in-chief of Kayhan, his biography of the
Ayatollah Khomeini provides useful tables and charts of the interlocking directorate of Shiite clergy.
Mackey, Wright, and Montaigne. Of these writers, Robin Wright
has had the longest contact as a journalist-observer of Iran, but all
of them note Iranian friendliness toward Americans and the love of
American popular culture.
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See Daneshvar for a typical Iranian's view that nothing happens in
Iran without secret interference of the British, Russians, and
Americans.
Parsons, 34, Parsons, the last British ambassador to Iran, and Radji,
the last Iranian ambassador to the UK, were constantly confronted
by the Shah to "do something" about the BBC.
See also Shawcross and Pahlavi (the Shah's last book) for insights
into the Shah's suspicion of Great Britain.
Banani and Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi and Iran Past and Present.
These three books provide the most thoughtful and encyclopedic
coverage of Iran's modernization.
Alam. This very frank diary by the Shah's most important ministers and confidantes catalogues the foreign policy interests of the
Shah. See also Bayne, a World Bank official who conducted interviews with the Shah over a long period regarding modernization
and the responsibilities of a modern monarch.
Pahlavi. In all three of the Shah's books, it is clear that he saw himself as an important global player, which for a time, he was. See
also Alam's day by day account of the global diplomatic scene in
Iran.
See Stempel, 5, Bayne, 203, and Zabih (the Mossadegh Era) 25-27,
for descriptions of Mossadegh's transformation from democrat to
demagogic dictator.
Graham, 17-18. This author was the London Financial Times
Middle East Correspondent in Tehran from 1975-77 and his financial analysis is indispensable.
See Sullivan, Sick, and Huyser for first-hand accounts of policy
conflicts and confusion in the White House and State Department.
Parsons, 144. Ambassador Parsons tried to warn the Shah of the
unwisdom of this policy.
Mohammadi. This Iranian journalist and his British wife were the
first to show how an underground press using hand duplicating
machines and cassettes could cancel out an expensive state propaganda machine.
Bani-Sadr, 1-2. Bani-Sadr admits that Khomeini was "handled" in
France. Reporters submitted questions in writing and the committee (Bani-Sadr and Khomeini said later: "In Paris, I found it expedient to say certain things. In Iran, I find it expedient to refute what
I said, and I do so unreservedly."
Afkhami, 94. He cites the three times the Shah had a crisis of

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol45/iss45/9

16

Farhat: Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution
122

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS

REVIEW

nerve: in 1953, when the CIA helped to bail him out; in 1963, when
Prime Minister Alam did it for him, and in 1978, when he refused
to use force..
Taheri, 19. Taheri describes the Ayatollah's first cassette, which
was designed for the "little people" whom the Shah had tried to
teach how to live and the Ayatollah told how to die.
Mohaddessin, 20, and O'Ballance, xvii.
Wright, 24.
Ibid, 32.
Ibid, 35.
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